Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms by Oberst, Paul Leo
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 46 | Issue 2 Article 1
1957
Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the
Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms
Paul Leo Oberst
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oberst, Paul Leo (1957) "Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 46 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol46/iss2/1
Recent Developments in Torts;
Decisions of the Court of Appeals
at the 1956-57 Terms
By PAuL OBERST*
ABo uT oiNE-FuH of the cases decided by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky at the three terms covered by this survey were Torts
cases.' Many of them should not have been appealed, but others
are useful precedents, and a few are real land-marks in the law.
The most important general impression one gains from reading
through this year's output of nearly one hundred2 torts cases is
the increasing use to which the Court has put the Restatement of
Torts and its powers under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
conflict between the Kentucky rule and the Restatement was
cited several times in justification for the overruling of a line of
Kentucky cases. The rules of Civil Procedure are being utilized to
give the judges more control over the jury in negligence cases
illustrated by a greater tendency, perhaps, to remand for entry of
judgment N.O.V. These are but general impressions. Now to
consider the more important cases in some analytical order.
IMM JNrrMEs
A new area of tort liability has opened up with the decision
of the Court in Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese.3 Plaintiff, third-
floor occupant of a tenement which had been devised to the
defendant charitable corporation, was injured in a fire in the
building. He sued, alleging defendant had failed to provide fire-
escapes required by statute4 and local ordinances. The Circuit
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 Fall 1956, Winter 1957 and Spring 1957. The long summer recess marks
the most convenient breaking point.2 The writer counted a total of 471 opinions, of which 94 were in Torts cases.
3 301 S.W. 2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. 101.700.
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Court dismissed on the basis of Kentucky's long-standing rule of
complete immunity of charitable corporations for their torts. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plea of immunity
was not available to a charitable corporation where there is (1)
corporate negligence in failing to perform a statutory duty, (2)
merely income-producing property, and (3) injuries to a stranger
to the charities. "This" said the Court, "is as far as we are re-
quired to go. It will be time enough when a case is presented
with any of these factors absent to determine what the decision
may be."'
The unanimous decision is rather surprising in view of the
sturdy defense of the charitable immunity doctrine by Judge Sims
in the recent case of Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital.0 Although
Judges Cammack, Moremen and Combs had dissented without
opinion in Red Gross Hospital, the following year in St. Walburg
Monastery v. Feltner's Admrr" the Court again affirmed the im-
munity and Judge Moremen's opinion noted that only he and
Judge Cammack found any reason to depart from Red Cross Hos-
pital.
Obviously what happened in the Roland case is that the judges
who have favored complete immunity in the past-Judges Sims,
Stewart and Milliken-consented to a slight erosion of the im-
munity rule in the interests of a unanimous decision by the Court.
The difficulty with this procedure, however, is the impossibility
of finding any logical stopping place once it has been decided
that some little diversion of trust funds is allowable and some
partial liability of charitable corporations is consistent with public
policy.
Surely it is irrelevant that the negligence is based on violation
of a penal law, rather than on common-law standards of care. If
negligence determined second-hand by the legislature is to be
distinguished from ordinary care, it is arguable that statute-violat-
ing charities should not be liable unless the legislature has ex-
pressly included them. Again, it seems unrealistic to seize upon
5 Supra note 3 at 579.
6 265 S.W. 2d 80 (Ky. 1954). Judge Sims noted that charitable immunity
is the majority rule, is favored by "some quite respectable texts", is "correct and
logical", and should be changed, if at all, by the legislature. Judge Sims regarded
the theory that private charity had been replaced by the paternalistic welfare state
in furnishing charitable services to the indigent as premature, to say the least.
7 275 S.W. 2d 784 (Ky. 1955).
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a failure of one of the charitable corporation's managers to pro-
vide a fire-escape as "administrative" or "corporate" negligence
(or breach of a "non-delegable" duty) while the negligence of
other servants of the corporation, equally injurious, is "non-corpo-
rate" or "delegable" and hence actionable.8
The facts that the defective property happens to be income-
producing and that plaintiff is a "stranger" to the charities also
seem to be unsound distinctions as they relate to the questions
of public policy and depletion of the trust fund. These exceptions
may be an effort to apply a rough sort of "assumption of risk"
which would bar recovery only by inmates of charitable institu-
tions.9
If "it is neither moral nor just that a stranger to a charity who
has been injured, as is alleged in the present case, as the result
of the management having violated safety laws in relation to an
activity which was no part of the operation of the charity itself,
should bear all the burden and the wrongdoer be entirely re-
lieved,"' 0 it is equally unjust that the injured person should bear
all the burden when he is not a stranger or when he is injured by
employee negligence in the operation of the charity itself. There
cannot in all justice be a special rule permitting servants of chari-
ties to injure beneficiaries with impunity. If assumption of risk
is the test, did this plaintiff not know he was occupying property
owned and poorly kept up by a charitable corporation and didn't
he voluntarily assume the risk to benefit from the lower rent
charged for the accomodations?"
Nor is the Court's suggestion of liability insurance a convinc-
ing answer. Insurance premiums will certainly cost the charities
of Kentucky more than the injured persons will receive, because
insurance companies, at least, are not charitable corporations."2
8 As authority for this exception the Court cited Note, 25 A.L.R. 2d 29 at 112.
No Kentucky cases are cited. The "corporate negligence" exception is discussed
in 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, 1672. Their conclusion: "What are
the limits of corporate negligence and how is it to be proved?"
9 See Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, supra note 6 at 81; 2 Harper and James,
supra note 8, 1669. The exception is sometimes put upon 'waiver by the bene-
ficiary. "But it does not correspond to the facts," 2 Harper and James, supra
note 8, 1669.10 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W. 2d 574 at 579 (Ky. 1957).
11 Indeed he was as much a beneficiary as the paying patient in a charitable
hospital for a beneficiary is, by the legal definition, one who benefits from the
fact that the hospital cannot be sued by patients.2 Judge Sims made this point in striking language in Forrest v. Red Cross
Hospital, 265 S.W. 2d 80 at 82 (Ky. 1954):
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The careful charity's trust funds will now be diverted to pay for
the recklessness of us all, as surely as the charitable funds of un-
named charitable hospitals were diverted to restore the plain-
tiff's health after he was injured by the negligence of defendant
charity in the principal case. 3
Not only are exceptions and reasons given in the opinion in
the Roland case rather inconclusive, but in addition the opinion
is so replete with dicta denouncing the injustice of the charitable
immunity doctrine and the duty of courts to keep pace with
customary morality, that it seems clear that something more than
the narrow distinction here is in the offing. Eventually the doc-
trine of charitable immunity in Kentucky will be overruled alto-
gether. If the immunity is to go, the Court could have lightened
its case-load by placing its decision on a broader basis than the
peculiar facts of the instant case, which is an invitation to take
every case against a charity to the Court of Appeals until firm
boundaries are set.
INTENTiONAL TORTS
One of the ancient anomalies of Kentucky tort law was the
rule imposing strict liability for a "trespass" resulting in physical
injuries.' 4 Although "Trespass", the common law form of action,
was said to lie for any direct, forcible and immediate injury to
possession, it is generally held today that there is liability for
trespass only in case of intentional invasion, negligence, or extra-
hazardous activity.' 5 Indeed, trespass, the tort, is now properly
"If immunity from tort be abolished from charitable institutions,
larger subscriptions and donations must be obtained to meet heavy
premiums on liability insurance, and the present enormous operating
expenses of such institutions will undoubtedly mount to dizzy heights.
They are already so high that paying patients in moderate circum-
stances can hardly afford hospitalization of even moderate duration."
It is obvious that Judge Sims' rejection of insurance has a different basis from the
arguments of those who think insurance makes a difference. He favors immunity
as a sort of continuous subsidy; proponents of insurance argue that with insurance
the charity can now avoid being crippled by a catastrophic loss and donors will
think of insurance as cost of operation rather than diversion of funds. See President
and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 823 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
13 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W. 2d 574, 579 (Ky. 1957).
14 See Denham, "Trespass-Absolute Liability Without Fault in Kentucky,"
35 Ky. LJ. 164 (1947).
'5 lestatement, Torts, sec. 166. Although an action may be for a negligent
trespass to land without proof of actual damage, trespass to the person without
actual damage requires proof of intent. Prosser notes that a Kentucky case of
"negligent assault and battery," Anderson v. Arnold's Ex'r 79 Ky. 370 (1881)
was succeeded by the contra holding in Perkins v. Stein and Co., 94 Ky. 433, 22
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limited to intentional invasions. 1 Kentucky, however, retained
the rule-or perhaps adopted it in 191417-that one could recover
for personal and property damage caused by an entry even
though the invasion was unintentional, non-negligent and not the
result of extra-hazardous conduct. The rule was criticized,' and
the Court in 1955, in a dictum in Jewell v. Dell," cast some doubt
upon it. Since the defendant in that case was clearly negligent, it
was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether he could also
be held strictly liable for "trespass".
In Randall v. Shelton, ° the plaintiff was struck by a stone
which was thrown upon her premises by the wheels of a passing
truck and broke her leg. She sued, alleging both negligence and
trespass, and recovered $6000. The Court reversed with direc-
tions to enter judgment for the defendant. There was no evidence
of negligence and no extra-hazardous activity; the "trespass"
theory was rejected, on the authority of Restatement sec. 166.
The street railway precedents were expressly overruled insofar
as they allowed recovery without proof of fault. The Court
pointed out that some of its "trespass" cases in fact involved in-
tentional or negligent acts or at least were "res ipsa loquitur"
cases. But, said the Court:
S.W. 649 (1893) without reference to the earlier case. Prosser, Torts (2d ed.
1955) 28.10 See Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W. 2d 92 at 95 (Ky. 1955), where the Court
also quoted United Electric Light Co. v. Deliso Construction Co., 315 Mass. 313,
52 N.E. 2d 553 (1943): "A trespass requires an affirmative voluntary act upon the
part of a wrongdoer and in that respect differs from negligence.
17Judge Clay's opinion in Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W. 2d 559, 561 (Ky.
1956) treats the rule as an exception created in Louisville Ry. Co. v. Sweeney, 157
Ky. 620, 163 S.W. 739 (1914).
18 Denham, supra note 14. See also, Prosser, Torts (2nd end. 1955) 55:
2There is no great triumph of reason in a rule which makes a street
railway, whose car jumps the track, liable only for negligence to a
pedestrian on the sidewalk, but absolutely liable to the owner of the
plate-glass window behind him."
1 284 S.W. 2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1955):
"We need not go into the intricacies of the rigorous common law
action of trespass for damages caused by the entry or invasion of
another's property, in which action about the only defenses were or
are that the entry was from causes beyond the trespasser's control.
The trend of modem authority is that an unintended entry or in-
trusion upon the property in possession of another does not constitute
actionable trespass. . . . In the light of this modern development of
the law of trespass we may leave open the subject of its application
to a case of the character of the one at bar. We decide it on the
issue of negligence."20 293 S.W. 2d 559 Ky. 1956).
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An attempt in this case to apply a strict rule of liability
based upon a concept of trespass to land would lead to an
incongruous result. ... To say that she could recover for
her injuries if she was in her yard but could not recover if
she was one step outside of it is a patent absurdity.2 '
One case of passing interest in the law of torts was a criminal
case, Driver v. Commonwealth,22 since it involved the privilege of
recaption of personal property. There the defendant repossessed
a locked financed car parked on a public street by breaking the
vent glass. His conviction of a breach of the peace was sustained.
The right to recapture personal property after voluntary sur-
render of possession to another under a conditional sales contract
does not permit a breach of the peace, but the Court had pre-
viously denied recovery against a seller who towed the car out of
the buyer's garage.23
NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL-ISK, PROXIMATE CAUSE,
AcruAL CAUSE AND WnAT HAvE You
What conduct is negligent? Apart from such special problems
as violation of statute and manufacturers' and occupants' liabili-
ties, which are considered later, there were a few cases of interest.
Edge v. Hook24 involved injury to plaintiff's tobacco crop by dust
from road-building. A judgment of dismissal was reversed, the
Court imposing a duty on road-builders to use care not to stir up
dust-which may have come as something of a surprise to that
profession. In Vaught's Adnmx v. Kentucky Utilities Co.25 the
Court held that obedience to state imposed safety regulations is
not itself conclusive on the negligence issue.
When defendant had been negligent in engaging in conduct
unreasonably risking harm, the question of liability for what re-
mains, with its subsidiary problems of actual causation and "re-
sult within the risk" versus "proximate causation". It is sometimes
very difficult to classify the problem as one of actual cause or
legal cause, cause-in-fact or proximate cause. Two cases decided
by the Court-both involving fires-illustrate this.
2 1 Id. at 562.
22 299 S.W. 2d 260 (Ky. 1957).
23 C.I.T. Corporation v. Short, 273 Ky. 190, 115 S.W. 2d 899 (1938), noted
by Kohrman, "Repossession of Chattels Under Conditional Sales Contracts," 4 K
Bar J. (No. 2) 15 at 19 (1939); cf. 47 Am. Jur., Sales sec. 953 at p. 165 (1943)24303 S.W. 2d 310 (Ky. 1957).
25 296 S.W. 2d 459 (Ky. 1956).
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In Verkamp Corp. of Ky. v. Hubbard26 defendant delivered
cylinders of propane with defective valves to plaintiff. When
plaintiff's store caught fire the heated cylinders exploded instead
of venting gas as proper valves do. Plaintiff sued for $50,000 dam-
ages for destruction of his store and was awarded $30,000 dam-
ages. On appeal, the Court regarded the question as one of scope
of the risk, which it proceeded to decide.27 Ordering entry of a
judgment for defendant N.O.V. the Court said:
... We determine as a matter of law that appellees" property
damage was not within the protection of the risk of such
failure since the damage was caused by fire, not explosion.2
Was the defendant not liable because the result was not
within the risk, or because the negligence was not even a cause-
in-fact of the injury? Another sentence in the opinion suggests
that perhaps actual cause was the real problem:
The safety valves were neither designed nor re-
quired to prevent the ignition of the gas after it was released
from the cylinders; had the valves operated properly, the
gas would have been released from the cylinders, and would
have ignited when subjected to fire.29
In Amerson v. Southern Bell Telephone Co.3 0 defendant negli-
gently failed to put through plaintiff's fire call, delaying the ar-
rival of the fire department by thirty minutes. Plaintiff's barn was
destroyed. Affirming a judgment N.O.V. for the phone company,
the Court said that it would be impossible to establish that "but
for" the negligence of defendants the injury to plaintiff would not
have occurred and that the negligence was not the "proximate
cause" of the loss, since many and varied agencies could have
combined to consummate the loss. Finally, damages would be
speculative since the proportion of loss caused by the negligence
could not be accurately determined.
26296 S.W. 2d 740 (Ky. 1956).
27 Ibid. at 742:
"The first question that arises is whether appellees' injury was within
the scope of the risk of the particular hazard which the safety valves
were designed to protect. . . . This question is one which the court
must decide, because the sco pe of the protection given appellees'
property under any principle of law must have a boundary or limit."
28 Id. at 742.
29 Ibid.
30 803 S.W. 2d 279 (Ky. 1957).
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It would seem to be within the realm of possibility, at least,
that the negligence was a substantial factor in causing the loss-
after all, plaintiff does not have to prove actual cause beyond a
reasonable doubt.31 Neither were any intervening forces adduced
to break the chain of "proximate cause" .3  Nor should it be the
rule that when an innocent cause and a negligent cause join to
contribute to a single result difficulty of apportionment results in
no liability.3a However, the case is one where the Court might
conclude that the duty of a telephone company should as a matter
of sound policy be defined so as not to include this particular risk.
It is arguable that phone companies should be no more liable than
water companies for carelessness which results in destruction of
their subscribers' homes by fire 34-at least in a time of almost
universal fire insurance.3 5 Despite the Court's assurances that
31 Prosser, supra note 18 at 222. Another case in which the court reversed
a judgment for failure of proof on the actual cause issue was Kentuck- Power Co.
v. Howard, 296 S.W. 2d 463 (Ky. 1956). Plaintiff had recovered for negligent
destruction of his house by defendant's failure to repair damaged insulators. The
Court reversed because the evidence that the wires could have caused the fire was
weak, and that wires did cause it was nothing more than conjecture-one specula-
tion based upon another.
32 The opinion states that "many and varied intervening agencies ...could
have combined to consummate appellants' loss," citing the leading case of Lebanon,
Louisville and Lexington Tel. Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 131 Ky. 718, 115 S.W.
824 (1909). The opinion notes (p. 281) that it was pointed out in the Lebanoncase that
"although the telephone company had placed the call, it would still
have to be assumed that the watchman at the fire station was awake,
that he would have sounded the alarm, that the other firemen would
have heard it, that they would have responded, that they would have
reached the scene of the fire without mishap, and that they would
have been able to put it out."
In the Amerson case, plaintiff put the fire chief on the stand to present evidence
to destroy these hypothetical "intervening forces." The imaginary intervening
forces are quite reminiscent of those summoned up by the New York Court in
Ryan v. New York Cent. R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866) in arbitrarily
limiting fire losses to the first adjoining building. Cf. Prosser, supra note 18, 172,
where he explains the Ryan rule as peculiar New York social policy.
33 Prosser suggests that when two causes combine to produce a single result
such as destruction of a house by fire, entire liability may be imposed even where
some of the causes are innocent-such as where a fire set by defendant is carried
by the wind. Prosser, supra note 18, 226. As an alternative, he suggests Judge
Peaslee's potential damage approach, which reduces loss on the basis of potentialdamage fom another cause: 'Then what is the value of a burning house which
the defendant prevents a fire engine from extinguishing. .Prosser, supra note
18, 231.
S.W 42 (127) Itisthemajrit rue tatthe"no-fesane"of a water corn-
zany which negligently fais to supply water at proper pressure, does not make it
abeto a citizen wose house is destroyed by fire as a result. Prosser, supra note
18, 516.
35 In the Amerson case, plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in Circuit Court-less
$2,965 insurance.
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Amerson is based on failure of proof of actual causation, it is not
unlikely that limitation of risk for damage thought to be too "re-
mote" and "speculative" played its part, perhaps unconsciously.
"Proximate cause" in the sense of injury brought about through
the operation of an intervening force was present in two cases.
In Ambrosius Industries v. Adams, 36 the Court held that de-
fendant's negligence in rigging a load was not superseded by the
negligence of the second defendant in moving it. In Carr v. Ken-
tucky Utilities Co.,37 however, the Court held that the negligence
of defendant utility in rigging a high tension wire only 1312 feet
above ground on a mountain was superseded by the intervening
unforeseeably negligent act of another in attempting to erect a
TV antenna alongside it-conduct characterized by the Court as
"unusual, irregular, foolhardy". The distinction resembles that
of the Restatement of Torts, sec. 442 (b): "consequences [that]
appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal."
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
That before negligence per se will apply defendant must have
violated a statute was illustrated by Adams v. Feck.38 There
plaintiff executed a left turn without giving a signal for 100 feet
as required by KRS 189.380, and was hit by the defendant's car
which appeared suddenly over the crest of the hill. The Court
held that plaintiff's failure to signal was no bar since a signal need
not be given "unless another might be affected by the movement"
and the statute had not been violated. Even where literal viola-
tion is conceded, courts often find reasons for a refusal to apply
the negligence per se doctrine-such as "no proximate cause" or
"excused violation". In addition, the violation must be an actual
cause of the accident and the result ought to be within the risk
the statute was intended to guard against, important safeguards
to recall when negligence per se threatens to run riot.39
What might have been a good res ipsa loquitur case was de-
stroyed by the technique of analyzing it into two components:
the question of negligence and the question of cause. In Rollins
30 293 S.W. 2d 230 (Ky. 1956).
37301 S.W. 2d 894 (Ky. 1957).
38803 S.W. 2d 287 (Ky. 1957).
39 See especially 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, sec. 17.6 at 1014:
"The effectiveness of these devices may perhaps be suggested by the paucity of




v. Avey, 40 the plaintiff was injured and his house was destroyed
by a gas explosion 30 minutes after one defendant had completed
installation of a gas floor furnace. Plaintiff joined the manu-
facturer, wholesaler, retailer and installer. Judgment of the trial
court, directed for the defendants, was affirmed, on the ground
that the instrumental cause of the accident was not established.
To infer the cause from the installation and the negligence from
the nature of the occurrence is "compounding of inferences",4 1
said the Court, quoting Judge Van Sant's observation in Le Sage
v. Pitts,412 that "a pyramiding of inferences never has been re-
garded as sound reasoning" and "the conclusion does not rise
above the dignity of mere speculation".
It is submitted that although there was no direct proof of
negligence or cause of the explosion, the circumstantial evidence
of both is at least as strong as in some other cases in which the
res ipsa doctrine has been applied.43 Ordinarily houses do not
explode thirty minutes after a gas furnace has been installed un-
less someone has been very negligentl The real problem is not
pyramiding inferences, but "negligence of whom?"-manufac-
turer, seller or installer-and the problem of res ipsa as applied to
multiple defendants. It is arguable that in such a situation it is
not unreasonable to force the defendants to explain or pay-a
procedural disadvantage which goes beyond negligence but stops
short of strict liability.44
MANuFAcRUE's NEGLIGENCE
Herme v. Tway45 was clearly the most important negligence
case at the last term. Plaintiff, who had purchased from an inde-
pendent dealer a semi-trailer manufactured by defendant, re-
covered for damage to the trailer and cargo, caused by a defective
40 296 S.W. 2d 214 (Ky. 1956).
41 Ibid. at 216.
42811 Ky. 155,,228 S.W. 2d 847, 852 (1949).
43 In Kentucky's famous Lewis v. Wol, 812 Ky. 526, 228 S.W. 2d 482
(1950) plaintiff recovered although defendant testified he had been away from
his car for over 80 minutes before it was put in motion and struck plaintiff.
44See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Calif. 2d 486, 154 Fac. 2d 687 (1944);
Prosser, supra note 18 at 208. It is interesting to note that LeSage v. Pitts supra
note 42, was a case in which the injury coald have resulted from the negligence
of any one of several building contractors and sub-contractors. On the other hand,
the two Kentucky cases of household gas explosions, cited in the Rollins case asjustifying directed verdicts for the defendants, involved negligence of installers
only-but in both cases the stoves had been in use for an extended period.
45 294 S.W. 2d 584 (Ky. 1956).
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king-pin. The defendant did not fraudulently conceal the defect
or even know of it. The defect was not obvious but could have
been discovered by a proper inspection. The Court set aside the
directed verdict for the defendant, abandoned "the ancient so-
called general rule of manufacturer's non-liability for negligence
to persons with whom he has no contractual relation", and ex-
pressly overruled the Olds Motor case. The Court cited as author-
ity the Restatement of Torts, sec. 895, which imposes liability on
a manufacturer of a chattel for bodily harm caused, but then
extended liability to damages to property also, citing the annota-
tion in 164 A.L.R. 569.
Even though the opinion discards all the ancient learning
regarding articles "inherently or intrinsically dangerous", articles
"imminently dangerous", "actual knowledge" of defects, and "de-
fects so obvious that knowledge will be presumed", all restrictions
are not abandoned. The opinion still speaks in terms of "safety"
precautions and the production of a "safe" product-presumably
physical safety of the person. 46 Plaintiff's property was the thing
damaged in this case, but defendant's duty was stated in terms
of unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm. Does the
Court answer in the negative Cardozo's famous Palsgraf question
-Is a distinction to be drawn according to the diversity of in-
terests invaded by the act?47-or does it merely leave open for the
time the question of whether a manufacturer may be held liable
to the ultimate purchaser for failure to inspect for defects which
risk harm to the property but not to the person of the purchaser
and others in the vicinity of the expected use?48
It should be noted that the "modern rule" of manufacturer's
liability was adopted in this case-forty years after Cardozo's
opinion in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 9-by the narrowest of
margins. The brief memoranda of the dissenting judges are not
crystal clear. Judges Cammack and Hogg were "of the opinion
that the change in law made by this opinion should have pro-
spective operation only". The change having been made by a
4-3 majority of the Court, do the dissenting judges now concede
46 Id. at 537.
47 Palsgraf v. Long Island B. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 at 101 (1928);
Restatement, Torts, sec. 281, Com.(g).
48 For example, the case of defective animal feed. Prosser, supra note 18, 502.
49217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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manufacturer's liability for negligence?5" Judge Sims' dissent
stands firm on Kentucky's famous precedent of 1911, saying "the
Olds Motor case is sound and should not be overruled"'.51 Curi-
ously enough, O/ds Motor was relied on by Judge Cardozo in
McPherson v. Buick as authority for the position that a manu-
facturer of an automobile, as a thing "imminently" dangerous was
liable for ordinary negligence.2 On the other hand Olds Motor
is usually read as imposing liability only for concealment of
known defects, where the article is not a "dangerous instru-
mentality". 3 Judge Sims apparently believes that even though a
trailer manufacturer realized that his failure to use care created
an unreasonable risk of harm to the public he should not be liable
if he did not actually know of and conceal the defect.
In an age when some are urging that strict liability be imposed
on manufacturers, so that consumer losses may be spread among
the consumers, 54 as Workmen's Compensation spreads employee
losses, surely Kentucky's adoption of the rule of McPherson v.
Buick is no startling advance. With deference, it may also be sug-
gested that the reservations of Cammack and Hogg, JJ, are un-
necessary. Retroactive change in law may work a hardship on
individuals who acted on the faith of long-standing precedents,
but it is doubtful in this case whether the manufacturer inspected
less carefully than he might in reliance upon Olds. Any manu-
facturer who did inspect carelessly should have been forewarned
by the Gaidry Motors case. Once the court had imposed liability
on the second-hand dealer who negligently failed to inspect,
liability of the manufacturer necessarily follows whether legal
"logic" or social engineering is the touchstone.15
50 Judge Cammack wrote the opinion in Davis v. Glass Coffee Brewing Co.,
296 Ky. 706, 178 S.W. 2d 407 (1944), characterized as "the most disturbing in-
dication that Kentucky has never fully departed from the antiquated approach in
manufacturers' liability cases," by Pennington, "Manufacturer's Liability in Ken-
tucky," 42 Ky. L.J. 273, 280 (1954). On the other hand, Judge Cammack voted
with the majority in the Gaidry Motors case.
51 Supra note 45, at 539.
52 Supra note 49, 111 N.E. at 1054.53 This is clearly Judge Cullen's reading of Olds in his opinion in the principal
case, supra note 45 at 536.
54 Jeanblanc, "Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Im-
mediate Vendees," 24 Va. L. Rev. 134, 157 (1937).
55 Gaidry has been cited by Prosser as an extention of the rule in McPherson
v. Buick. See Prosser, supra note 18, 501:
"The McPherson decision did not go beyond liability to the ultimate
purchaser himself. Later cases have extended it. . . . The maker of
an automobile is liable to a pedestrian who is struck because it has
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Herme v. Tway is also important for the detail with which the
opinion spelled out the standard of care in a manufacturer's case.
Rejecting the standard of custom5 the opinion stated that reason-
able care is a question for the jury in the light of (1) risk of
danger (2) availability of suitable safety methods and (3) the
practicability and economic feasibility of employing safety
methods. The manufacturer's defense is said by the Court to be
that "more careful tests or inspections would not be practicable
or economically feasible in relation to the risk of danger in-
volved".57
In another manufacturer's case, James v. Hillerich and Brads-
by," the Court denied recovery to plaintiff, baseball pitcher,
whose eye was put out by a splinter from a bat made by de-
fendant. Plaintiff claimed that the bat was defective in that it
contained a painted-over knot which caused the bat to break
cleanly in two. The Court approved the dismissal on the merits,
on the ground that the defect did not materially increase the
risk of harm to plaintiff. "It is common knowledge that bats fre-
quently break, and we think that it is immaterial that a properly
made bat ordinarily will splinter with the grain while one made
of defective wood may break across the grain". 59 A cursory check
with a few baseball players and coaches suggests that what the
Court took judicial notice of may not in fact be so, which in turn
suggests that disposition of the case on the pleadings may have
been inadvisable."0
bad brakes (citing Gaidry) .... On the defendant's side the liability
has been extended to the maker of a component part of the final
product, and to an assembler of parts; and it has been held to apply
to a second-band dealer who reconditions automobiles for sale."
(citing Gaidry)
This is to suggest that the rule in McPherson v. Buick was adopted by indirection
in the Gaidry case in 1953. Herme v. Tway merely makes it more explicit by
overruling Olds.
GO The opinion probably goes too far in rejecting proof of custom in manu-
facturers' cases. Custom has its uses. See Morris, Torts, 108-112.57 Herine v. Tway, 294 S.W. 2d 534, 538 (Ky. 1956).
58 299 S.W. 2d 92 (Ky. 1957). Since the injury occurred in St. Louis, the
court applied Missouri law, which requires that the article be 'imminently, in-
trinsically, inherently, or essentially dangerous" and "by reason of its defective
condition and intended use . . . reasonably certain to cause injury." Fortunately,
however, any article involving an "unreasonable risk of bodily harm" under Re-
statement, see. 395 satisfies the formidable test drawn from the Missouri cases-
although a knotty bat comes within neither.
59 Id. at 94.




In occupant cases, the Court faces the double problem of as-
signing the injured party to his proper category and then de-
termining the occupant's duty toward him. In Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Blevins6' the plaintiffs automobile was
struck by defendant's train as it backed along its main track
parallel to a business street. Since plaintiff's car was clearly on
the railroad's right of way, the railroad argued that she was an
undiscovered trespasser to whom it owed no duty. The Court,
however, classified her as a gratuitous licensee, to whom the rail-
road owed the duty to keep a look out and warn. This is a typical
example of "reclassification of trespassers", and quite justified, as
here the likelihood of the presence of trespassers creates a high
probability of harm to someone.62
The line between "licensee" and "invitee" or "business visitor"
is a troublesome one. Several years ago in the Ockerman 3 case,
the Court classified a visiting clergyman soliciting funds as a
"licensee" on the ground that there was no mutuality of business
interest as required by sec. 332, Restatement of Torts. In Scuddy
Mining Co. v. Couch64 the plaintiff was injured while crossing a
tramway when a loose tie flew up and caused his mule to buck.
On the first appeal the Court classified plaintiff as a licensee. 5
On the second appeal, after new evidence showing plaintiff
entered upon the tramway "at the expressed invitation of the
defendant's foreman" and crossed at a place pointed out by him,
the Court classified plaintiff as an "invitee", saying:
Frank's dissenting opinion in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969,
976 (2d Cir. 1948) where, faced with the question of whether "Seventeen"
magazine's trade-mark was infringed by Seventeen girdles, he observed:
"As neither the trial judge nor any member of this court is (or re-
sembles) a teen-age girl or the mother or sister of such a girl, ourjudicial notice apparatus will not work well unless we feed it with
information directly obtained from 'teen-agers' or from their female
relatives accustomed to shop for them. . . . I have questioned some
adolescent girls and their mothers and sisters, persons I have chosen
at random. I have been told uniformly by my questionees that no
one could reasonably believe that any relation existed between plain-
tiff's magazine and defendant's girdles."
61293 S.W. 2d 246 (Ky. 1956).
62 Se2 Harper and James, supra note 8, sec. 27.7.
63 Ockerman v. Faulkner's Garage, 261 S.W. 2d 296 (Ky. 1953), noted by
Soyars, 48 Ky. L.J. 828 (1955).64 295 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1956).65 Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W. 2d 388 (Ky. 1954).
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Under these facts we conclude that there was an implied
representation that care had been exercised to make the
tramway safe for use. Thus, it follows that appellee was
an invitee. .. .6
Scuddy II is certainly a flat rejection of Restatement classifica-
tion, which would surely regard this plaintiff as a licensee, there
being no mutual business interest, and hence not entitled to re-
cover for an injury due to a defective condition of which the oc-
cupant had no actual knowledge, invitation notwithstanding.
67
The Court's refusal to follow Restatement categories here is hardly
to be regretted, however. The "business visitor" concept, which
was developed in the United States by Bohlen, the reporter for
the Restatement of Torts, is rejected both by Prosser and Harper
and James.68 The forthcoming Second Restatement of Torts, for
which Prosser is reporter, may well return to the earlier concept
of "invitee"-one given actual or implied representation that
reasonable care has been exercised to make the place safe, which
makes the occupant liable for defects he could have discovered
by a reasonable inspection. Perhaps the second Scuddy case is
right and Ockerman is wrong.
Where classification is clear scope of duty may present pitfalls.
In Otto v. Phillips,"9 an 83 year old plaintiff tripped over the ex-
tended feet of a small boy who sat on the floor reading comics in
defendant's drug store. The occupant has a duty to the licensee
not only to inspect the premises for defects, but "he is required
to take action ... when he has reason to believe, from what he
has observed or from past experience, that the conduct of [a third
person] will be dangerous to the visitor. . ". ."7' But the Court
said: "The only question involves whether a store owner must
continuously anticipate every action and move of every person
who is a licensee or invitee" (writer's italics)." The answer to
that question was obviously "No", and the Court sustained a judg-
ment for the defendant on the ground of no negligence-although
60 Supra note 64 at 554.
;7 Restatement, Torts, sees. 330, 332.
08 2 Harper and James, supra note 8, 1478-1488. Prosser, supra note 18,
452-458.
09 299 S.W. 2d 100 (Ky. 1956).70 Prosser, supra note 18, 460; see also Restatement, Torts, sec. 348; James,
Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 NW.U.L.Rev. 778, 809 et seq. (1953).
71 Supra note 69, at 103.
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the asserted contributory negligence of the plaintiff was appar-
ently the principal issue discussed in the appellant's brief.72
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Sizemore v. Bailey's Adnmr 73 was perhaps the most interesting
contributory negligence case last year. Plaintiff, Charles Bailey,
sued as administrator to recover for the death of his twelve year
old son, Bert, in a collision with defendant's car. Bert was a
passenger in a car owned and operated by Charles' 17 year old
son Shafter, who was driving under a permit signed by Charles.
KRS 186.590 imputes the negligence of the minor permit holder
to the signer, and makes him jointly and severally liable with the
minor driver for negligence. Defendant argued that Shafter's
contributory negligence was thus imputed to Charles and Charles'
negligence should in turn be imputed to the decedents mother.74
Noting that the Restatement of Torts75 took no position on this
question, the Court turned to the owner-driver statutes for a
parallel. Rejecting the majority rule which construes the owner-
driver statutes as imputing the driver's contributory negligence
to the owner to bar a recovery, the Court followed the Minnesota-
New York minority view that the statutes are "financial responsi-
bility" laws and are not intended to deal with contributory negli-
gence. KRS 186.590 was construed as intending to provide an
additional source of financial responsibility. The interpretation
seems quite sound as a practical matter, although the Court un-
fortunately reaffirmed the anomalous rule imputing contributory
negligence of one parent to another to bar any recovery against a
negligent defendant for wrongful death of a child.
Death of a farmer in a "gallant attempt" to save his cow from
a railroad train resulted in a $10,000 verdict, which was reversed
in Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Wallace.76 Denying the
applicability of last clear chance, where decedent knew of the
72 On the issue of negligence was there prooof of a custom of small boys to
sit on appellant's floor to read his comic books? It is the writer's observation that
drugstore floors throughout the Commonwealth are cluttered with small boys
reading comics.73 293 S.W. 2d 165 (Ky. 1956).
74 On imputation of contributary negligence between parents see Emerine v.
Ford, 254 S.W. 2d 938 (Ky. 1953), distinguishing Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230
S.W. 2d 610 (1950). For a criticism of the Kentucky rule, see Walden, note, 39
Ky. L.J. 479 (1951).
75 Sec. 485, Caveat.
76 302 S.W. 2d 561 (Ky. 1956).
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danger and was himself able to escape up to the last moment,77
the Court quoted from Saddler v. Parham the statement that
"it is held by the great weight of authority that it is only where
the plaintiff is physically unable to escape from his peril that the
defendant is held responsible on the ground that he should have
discovered the peril".7 8
Voluntary assumption of risk did not protect a railroad, negli-
gently backing a car, from a recovery by a plaintiff on its tracks,
the Court saying:
One does not assume a risk resulting from another person's
active negligence or breach of legal duty to him unless he
sees or should see, the risk he is incurring.79
In Carlisle v. Reeves,80 however, a motorist who stopped behind
defendant's truck to take its license number after a collision and
was hit by the second defendant who was driving while drunk on
Fourth Street in Louisville on a dark rainy night, was barred.
The Court held that he could not recover from either defendant
for the loss of his leg in the second accident since
A person who, with knowledge of a dangerous situation,
voluntarily places himself in a position where he takes the
chance of being hurt, and is in fact injured, cannot recover
for his injuries.8 '
It is submitted with deference that to charge plaintiff with
assuming the risk of drunken driving goes quite far. If the cir-
cumstances were such that the plaintiff risked the same harm
from a sober driver, however, he cannot complain that it was a
drunken driver who struck him.
77 Id. at 565: ". . . the decedent was not in a position where he was unable
to escape from his peril if he had used proper caution. In fact, he voluntarily
moved into the hazardous position in an attempt to save his property."78 249 S.W. 2d 945 at 949 (Ky. 1952). Accord, Restatement, Torts, secs.
479, 480; 2 Harper and James, supra note 8, 1251.70 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Blevins, 293 S.W. 2d 246 at 250(Ky. 1956).
80 294 S.W. 2d 74 (Ky. 1956). The court noted plaintiff's testimony that he
knew it was dangerous to stand in the street with his back to the oncoming traffic
for the purpose of obtaining the license number. "While the testimony may or may
not constitute a judicial adssion of contributory negligence, it does show that
Reeves knew the risk involved in his undertaking, and that he voluntarily assumed




Two negligence cases during the last year may be straws in
the wind, predicting strict liability to come. Kentucky has long
imposed strict liability for blasting where there is "direct" injury,
but has required proof of negligence for "indirect" damage from
concussion.8 2 This distinction has been characterized as a rpar-
riage of procedural technicality and scientific ignorance and
persists in only a small minority of the states.83 In Aldridge-
Poage v. Parks,8 4 plaintiff had recovered $200 for "trespass" dam-
age and $10,000 for concussion damage. The Court reversed the
award for concussion damage on the grounds that plaintiff had
failed to prove negligence. The case may be less significant for its
holding than for its dictum, however. Pointing out that the rule
prevailing in this state denied liability for concussion damage
without proof of negligence the Court said:
While we have serious doubt of the soundness of this rule,
we have concluded not to re-examine it in this particular
case.
85
In Marlowe Construction Co. v. Jacobs the Court again referred
to its serious doubt concerning the soundness of the concussion
rule, but there sustained a verdict for the plaintiff on negligence
grounds. The Court concluded that proof of concussion damage
made out a prima facie case of negligence on res ipsa loquitur
principles. Defendant's attempt to rebut the inference was
countered by expert opinion testimony of the plaintiff, based on
defendant's own proof of actual precautions taken.
The next concussion-damage plaintiff might be well advised to
prosecute his case on the strict liability theory if there is any
doubt of negligence, relying on the weight of authority and le-
statement of Torts secs. 519 and 520 to persuade the Court to
resolve its doubts in favor of strict liability for blasting damage.
Prosser has suggested that all blasting liability may be a question
of when and how: the use of explosives on an uninhabited moun-
tainside is a matter of negligence only, but anyone who blasts in
8 2 Williams v. Codell Construction Co., 253 Ky. 166, 69 S.W. 2d 20, 92
A.L.R. 737 (1934) and cases cited therein.83 Prosser, supra note 18, 336 at note 72.
84297 S.W. 2d 632 (Ky. 1956).
85 Id. at 633.
863 02 S.W. 2d 612 (Ky. 1957).
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the center of a large city does so at his peril.87 The difficulty in
classifying the blasting in Aldridge-Poage, where farm property
was damaged in building a water-line from the Kentucky river
to the City of Nicholasville, may be grounds for preferring a
blanket rule of strict liability regardless of location. Continuation
of the trespass-concussion distinction does not seem justified, how-
ever, particularly after the decision in Randall v. Shelton.88
DA AGEs
With Ambrosius Industries v. Adams,89 the "Adequate Award"
apparently came to Kentucky. In that case plaintiff, a 45 year old
construction worker who suffered a spinal injury, received a judg-
ment of $75,000, which was characterized by appellants attorney
as "the largest ever awarded in a personal injury case in this
state". No punitive damages were involved, the judgment includ-
ing loss of earning power, medical expenses of $15,000 and pain
and suffering. Plaintiff's earning power was not totally destroyed,
and the opinion of the Court emphasized rather the pain and loss
of control of bodily function (including sexual function) in hold-
ing that the award was not excessive.
In Sims Motor Transportation Lines v. Foster,90 the Court
sustained a verdict of $25,000 for fractures of the femur, jawbone
and collar-bone of a 21 year old plaintiff. One doctor's testimony
that plaintiff was 40 per cent disabled -and that his disability
would increase with age apparently impressed the Court, which
said:
We are able to say with no reservation, that a verdict of
$25,000 given to a man 21 years of age who has incurred a
forty percent permanent disability is not excessive. 91
In Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm.92 the Court sustained awards
of $55,000 and $20,000 for the death of a husband and wife, aged
51 and 54 respectively. There is no hint who the ultimate
beneficiary of the award was or whether defendant or his insur-
ance company ultimately paid it. As judgments in auto collision
8 7 Prosser, supra note 18, 336 at note 74.
88 Supra, note 20.
89 293 S.W. 2d 230 (Ky. 1956).
90 293 S.W. 2d 226 (Ky. 1956).
91 Id. at 229. However realistic per cent of disability testimony may be, it
has a considerable vogue. One might speculate about its relative impact on thejury as contrasted with the more experienced Workmen's Compensation Board.
92 293 S.W. 2d 863 (Ky. 1956).
1958]
KNTCKY LAW JoNAL [
cases grow larger, the suitability of Kentucky's wrongful death
statutes becomes more and more questionable from the standpoint
of social policy. In Sarrington's case did the jury destroy de-
fendant's small business to pay a windfall of $75,000 to remote
relatives of the deceased, or did an insurance company pay a
judgment which goes for the support of minor children"3-spread-
ing the risk among the auto-driving public?94
Defendants' attorneys might take some comfort from Scuddy
Mining Co. v. Couch,9 where the Court reversed a $80,000 judg-
ment for the plaintiff, who was thrown from his mule, on the
ground that it was grossly excessive. Their enthusiasm for the
Scuddy Mining case might be somewhat dimmed by the Court's
disposition of the appeal, however. The Court, noting that two
juries had found against the defendant on the issue of culpability,
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages alone,
saying:
The present suit is a tort case. Evidence going to show the
manner in which the accident occurred could not conceiv-
ably have the slightest bearing upon the nature and extent
of appellee's injuries. . . . We think it would violate the
spirit and intent of CR 59.01 to again require a retrial of the
question of appellant's culpability. We regard this case as
an appropriate one in which to inaugurate this procedure.08
How extensive a departure from previous procedures is in-
augurated is uncertain. The opinion suggests that in tort cases
generally the issue of damages and the issue of culpability are
severable. This is true analytically, but not practically. Within
the expansive confines of the general verdict in a negligence case,
the jury may award punitive damages against the defendant or
reduce the plaintiffs recovery to allow for his contributory or
comparative negligence. But this is nowhere better stated than in
the opinion of Stanley, C., in Smith v. Webber, 97 cited in the prin-
cipal case. In the Scuddy case itself, there was no evidence justi-
fying either a "punitive" award or a reduction for "comparative
93 The writer has been informally advised that all excpt $5,000 of the judg-
ment was in fact paid by an insurance company to an adult son, living in another
state.94 For another case of an Adequate Award, see Carlisle v. Reeves, 294 S.W.
2d 74 (Ky. 1956) where the jury gave $63,991 for loss of one leg. Reversed on
grounds of assumption of risk, supra note 80.
95 295 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1956). 96 Id. at 554.
97 282 S.W. 2d 346 (Ky. 1955).
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fault". The case must be read in the light of its facts and the
opinion in Smith v. Webber: A partial retrial limited to the dam-
ages issues will be granted in a negligence case where the verdict
was so excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice and where
under the particular facts the issue of damages is as a practical
matter distinct and separable from the issue of negligence.
PARs PLAINTIFF AN DFmm
Several recent cases have involved the question whether an
insured plaintiff who has been paid by the insurer and has exe-
cuted a "loan agreement" remains a real party in interest under
CR 17.01 and whether the insurance company becomes an indis-
pensable party. The majority of the Court have concluded that
the loan agreements should be recognized at their face value."
Judge Cammack has characterized the "loan agreements" as fic-
tions which should be ignored. The Court's ready acceptance of
the "loan agreement" stems, no doubt, from its long-standing rule
against any mention of defendant's insurance in an accident case,
the basis for which was seemingly undermined by the decision
in L. & N. R.R. Co. v. Mack Mfg. Corp."
Indemnity and contribution between defendants were ap-
parently confused by counsel in two cases decided in the past
year. In Phelps v. Brown00 a judgment of $6,000 was recovered
against the employer Brown and employee Phelps, jointly and
severally, for the latter's negligence in tossing a flaming can of
gasoline at a third party. Brown satisfied the judgment and then
sued his employee for contribution. The judgment for $3,055.29
for contribution under KRS 412.030 was affirmed. The Court ob-
served that since the employee was the active wrongdoer pri-
marily liable and the employer only secondarily liable, the em-
ployer might have sued to recover on the basis of indemnity the
entire sum paid in satisfaction of the judgment, under Brown
Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co.1 1
In Ambrosius Industries v. Adams,102 Adams recovered $25,000
against one Holloway, who negligently rigged a crane lift, and
98Aetna Freight Lines v. R. C. Tway Co., 298 S.W. 2d 293 (Ky. 1957).
Ratcliff v. Smith, 298 S.W. 2d 18 (Ky. 1957); and see State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hall, 292 Ky. 22, 165 S.W. 2d 838 (1942).
99 269 S.W. 2d 707 (Ky. 1954).
100 295 S.W. 2d 804 (Ky. 1956).
101311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W. 2d 165 (1949).
102 293 S.W. 2d 230 (Ky. 1956).
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$50,000 against Ambrosius Co., which negligently lifted. Hollo-
way cross-claimed against Ambrosius Co. for indemnity which the
trial court peremptorily denied. On appeal, the Court affirmed,
saying:
Indemnity between tort-feasors is allowed when the negli-
gence of the person claiming indemnity is passive and
secondary and the negligence of the person from whom in-
demnity is sought is primary and active.'03
Since the negligence of Holloway was a concurring primary cause,
rather than a secondary one, indemnity was not permitted.
Whether contribution could have been recovered in such a case
is more of a problem, the solution of which may be found some-
where between the Brown Hotel case and Gish Realty Co. v.
Central City.10 4 Nothing would be more helpful than a statutory
clarification of the right to indemnity and contribution, with due
regard to the problems of practice under the new civil rules.
103 Id. at 238.
104 260 S.W. 2d 946 (Ky. 1953).
